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A simple model economy with locally interacting producers and consumers is introduced. When
driven by extremal dynamics, the model self-organizes not to an attractor state, but to an asymptote,
on which the economy has a constant rate of deflation, is critical, and exhibits avalanches of activity
with power-law distributed sizes. This example demonstrates that self-organized critical behavior
occurs in a larger class of systems than so far considered: systems not driven to an attractive fixed
point, but, e.g., an asymptote, may also display self-organized criticality.
Introduction. It has been amply demonstrated by
now that some driven extended dissipative systems
will self-organize into a complex critical state in which
events of all sizes occur. This phenomenon, called Self-
Organized Criticality (SOC) [1], has been invoked to ex-
plain phenomena such as the experimentally observed be-
havior of flux-lines in high-Tc super conductors [2], solar
flares, and earthquakes [3]. Several theoretical models
that exhibit SOC have been constructed [1,4–6], for a re-
cent review see [7]. In all these models the SOC state is
a (statistically) stationary state.
Here we demonstrate by example that one may ob-
serve SOC behavior also in systems which have no sta-
tionary attractor state. The example is a simple one-
dimensional model economy driven by extremal dynam-
ics. In this model, agents interact locally with each other
through a fixed set of rules. As in standard economic
theory [8], agents have utility functions which they try
to maximize. But contrary to classical economic equilib-
rium theory, we have no ‘central agent,’ ‘market maker,’
or ‘auctioneer.’ Maximization of utility functions is left
to individual agents. The agents have information only
about agents with whom they interact directly, i.e., their
nearest neighbors.
Agents are rational and never change their strategies,
only their prices and the quantities they buy and pro-
duce. By their transactions, agents make a profit, posi-
tive or negative. The agent who makes the most negative
profit then changes his price slightly, in a manner that
increases his profit. In the next time step the agents do
another round of optimized transactions, and the agent
now having the most negative profit changes his price.
This process in repeated ad infinitum.
After a transient period, the system arrives in a state
with long-range spatial correlations (power-laws) and de-
flation with constant rate. The distribution of profits
displays a distinct threshold. Avalanches of causally
connected price-changes by agents with profits below
this threshold are observed. The size distribution for
avalanches follows a power law.
The Model. Consider N agents numbered n =
1, 2, . . . , N . Agent number n sells his product to agent
number n − 1 and buys the product produced by agent
number n+ 1. We assume that individual agents do not
consume their own production, so in order to consume
they must trade, and in order to trade they must pro-
duce. Agent number n produces a quantity qn, of a good
which is sold at a price pn, per unit, to his neighbor
numbered n − 1. He subsequently buys and consumes
the quantity qn+1 of the good produced by his neigh-
bor numbered n + 1, who subsequently buys the good
produced by his neighbor numbered n + 2, etc., until
all agents have made two transactions. This process is
repeated, say once per day.
The goal of each agent is to maximize his utility func-
tion
un = −c(qn) + d(qn+1) (1)
while satisfying the constraint
pnqn = pn+1qn+1 . (2)
The first term, −c, in the utility function in Eq. (1) rep-
resents the agent’s cost, or discomfort, connected with
the production of qn units of the good he produces. This
discomfort is an increasing function of q, and c is convex
because, say, the agent grows tired. The second term, d,
is the utility of the good he buys from his neighbor. Its
marginal utility is a decreasing function of quantity q, so
d is an increasing, but concave, function. This choice of
c and d is common in economics; see, e.g., [9].
The constraint is also typical in economics. It is the
simplest possible. It expresses that the agents do not
trust money; they accept money as currency, but do not
want to possess any at the end of the day. There is no
utility associated with its possession. Also, of course, the
agents want not to run out of money which would prevent
them from getting any utility.
An explicit utility function is chosen for illustration
and analysis,
un = −1
2
(qn)
2 + 2
√
qn+1 . (3)
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An agent knows the prices of his two neighbors at all
times. The amount of goods produced by the two neigh-
bors is not known since, as we shall see, this amount de-
pends on the next nearest neighbors’ prices, which again
depends on his neighbors’ prices, etc. For the same rea-
son, the demand for goods at a given time is not known
either. A similar model was invoked [10] in order to ex-
plain the dynamic origin of the value of money.
Using his utility function and the prices he knows, each
agent plans how much to produce and how much to pur-
chase, assuming that everything he produces will be sold,
and that all he wants to purchase will be available. The
task is a simple optimization problem with solution
q(prod.)n =
(
pn
pn+1
)1/3
(4)
and
q
(want)
n+1 =
(
pn
pn+1
)4/3
. (5)
We note in Eq. (4) and (5) that the levels of produc-
tion and intended consumption are independent of abso-
lute prices, as they depend only on ratios. All prices may
be multiplied by a common factor, and leave quantities
produced and consumed unchanged.
Next, agent number n implements his plan by produc-
ing the quantity qn, and setting it for sale at the price
pn. However, his costumer, agent number n − 1, has
planned to buy the quantity q
(want)
n , and will do so, if
q
(want)
n ≤ q(prod.)n . If q(want)n > q(prod.)n , agent n − 1 buys
the quantity available, q
(prod.)
n . Thus, the traded amount
is q
(trad.)
n = min(q
(prod.)
n , q
(want)
n ).
At the end of the day agent n has, unwillingly, made
the profit
sn = pnq
(trad.)
n − pn+1q(trad.)n+1 . (6)
An agent may have negative profit if he does not sell as
much as he planned, i.e., if q
(trad.)
n < q
(prod.)
n . An agent
who in this way loses money, is not fulfilling the con-
straint Eq. (2). Neither is an agent who makes money.
The agent who loses most money reacts by changing his
price, which is the only variable controlled by agents in
this model. For a given price, an agent’s strategy is fixed,
and the amount produced by the agent is determined
by Eq. (4). As can be seen from Eqs. (4–6), an agent
with negative profit increases his profit by lowering his
price [11].
When agent n lowers his price, his estimate of how
much he should optimally produce and consume also
drops. Conversely, his costumer agent n − 1, raises his
estimate of how much he should optimally buy. Agent
n’s supplier does not change his estimates of how much
he should produce and consume, hence he risks produc-
ing more than he can sell. In this way an agent with
negative profit increases his profit by lowering his price,
while potentially “passing on” the problem of negative
profit to his supplier.
Computer Simulation. In a simulation of the model,
N agents are initially given random prices drawn from
a uniform distribution on the interval [1,2] [12], relative
price changes, η, are drawn from a uniform distribution
on the interval [0, ηmax].
The update scheme is: (i) the levels of production and
intended consumption are found from Eqs. (4) and (5);
(ii) the profit of each agent is determined from Eq. (6);
(iii) the agent with the lowest (most negative) profit is
found, and given a new, lower price; (iv) go to (i).
We studied systems of various sizes, ranging from 200
to 20,000 agents, on time-scales from some hundreds to
108 updates, and with ηmax ranging from 0.1% to 10%.
Results turned out to be insensitive to the particular
value used for ηmax. After an initial transient period,
the system organized itself into a state where the spatial
distribution of profits exhibit a clear threshold fc, see
Fig. 1. Few or no agents are found to have profits be-
low this threshold, and those found tend to be spatially
located near the “loser.”
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FIG. 1. Distribution of profits after 2 · 107 time steps,
rescaled by exp(2.5092t); notice the delta function at
zero profit. The dashed line marks the threshold value
f0 = −0.0057 < fc.
Figure 2 shows how the loser’s role moves through the
system. It clearly drifts in one direction, because of the
left-right asymmetry of the utility function. But it also
does a good deal of jumping about.
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FIG. 2. Spatio-temporal distribution of the losing
agents in an economy with N = 200 agents. Abscissa:
loser’s coordinate. Ordinate: time.
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The spatial correlations of the loser positions were ex-
amined by measuring the distribution of distances be-
tween successive losers. If the spatial jump x, between
two successive losers was more than half the system-size
to the right, it was counted as a jump to the left. The
distribution of distances between successive losers follow
a power law distribution asymptotically at large values
of the distances, i.e., the system is critical. We fitted the
distribution of distances between successive losers to the
expression
P (x) = Ax−pi
(right)
+ B(N − x)−pi(left) +C , (7)
and found the exponent values pi(right) = 1.844 ± 0.002
and pi(left) = 2.021 ± 0.002. C is a constant which
takes into account the approximately flat distribution of
“avalanche starters” [13]. While the backing of the fit
is 70%, the possibility that pi(left) = 2 cannot be ruled
out [14].
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FIG. 3. Distribution of the spatial separation be-
tween successive losers. Economy with 2000 agents,
ηmax = 0.1%, 10
8 time steps sampled after the initial
transient phase. (a) Jumps to the right. (Jumps to the
left have a similar looking distribution). (b) Same data
as in (a), but binned. Plot shows mean and RMSD of
data in each bin, as well as a χ2-fit of Eq. (7) to the data
shown in (a) and similar data for jumps to the left. Expo-
nents pi(right) = 1.844±0.002 and pi(left) = 2.021±0.002.
The backing of the fit is Pn′(> χ
2) = 70%.
Since agents keep lowering their prices, the threshold
in profit distributions decreases to zero exponentially in
time, fc(t) ∝ exp(−kt), where k = 〈η〉/[N(1 − 〈η〉)] to
leading order in 〈η〉 [15], and 〈·〉 denotes an ensemble or
time average.
When all profits are rescaled by exp(kt), we obtain sta-
tionarity of the threshold fc. We next consider the ac-
tivity below a threshold f0 < fc, and define an avalanche
as the duration of causally connected activity below this
threshold. We refer to this duration as the avalanche size
S.
Since it is always the agent with the lowest profit who
changes his price and causes activity, it is sufficient to
monitor his profit, and follow whether it is above or be-
low f0. When sloser > f0, all agents are above the thresh-
old, and there is no active avalanche by our definition of
avalanches. However, as the system evolves according to
the update rules, soon an agent is below threshold, and
a new avalanche has been initiated.
Figure 4 shows a log-log plot of the avalanche size dis-
tribution for a system of 2000 agents. Measurements
were made during 107 time steps, after discarding the
first 106 time steps. We clearly see a power law P (S) ∝
S−1.48±0.03. The value of the exponent, τ = 1.48, is in-
distinguishable from 3/2, the latter being the exponent
of the distribution of first-return-times for an unbiased
random walker. However, when studying the avalanche
size distribution for varying positions of the threshold f0,
a distribution function of a form well known from perco-
lation theory [16] suggests itself
P (S) = S−τg(S(fc − f0)1/σ) , (8)
where the Fisher exponent τ , now plays the role of the
avalanche size distribution coefficient. g(x) is a scaling
function, with the properties g(x) → 0 for x → ∞,
g(x) → g(0) for x → 0, and σ is the avalanche cutoff
exponent [17]. Hence, the system cannot be adequately
described in terms of a simple unbiased random walker.
The exponent value 3/2 is also characteristic of mean
field theory, and was, e.g., obtained in the mean field
treatment of the Bak-Sneppen model [4], which has some
similarity with the model treated here. However, as
shown in [18] for the simplest possible SOC system [19],
the exponent 3/2 can occur also in a system with fluc-
tuations. So one cannot from the value of our exponent
conclude that mean field theory is exact for our model in
one dimension .
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FIG. 4. Distribution of avalanche sizes in the critical
state. The size of an avalanche is the number of sub-
sequent system updates with (rescaled) profits less than
f0 = −0.0057.
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Discussion and Conclusion. Comparing to the Bak-
Sneppen model [4], we use not one variable, but two vari-
ables, the profit and the price. The profits are used to
find the overall loser in the system, but we do not adjust
the profit directly. Rather, the system is driven by the
losing agent’s adjustment of his price, though he is de-
fined by his (lack of) profit. Also, since ηmax is chosen
small, we do not randomize much. Finally, in the Bak-
Sneppen model neighbors to a least-fit species have their
fitness randomized, but in the present model nothing was
done to the neighbors of a loser—only the loser had some-
thing changed, his price. The effect on his neighbors of
this change was predetermined and deterministic, and
yet the system is SOC. Thus it seems that it does not
matter how a system is driven. As long as an extremal
property is chosen and adjusted in some way, the system
will eventually build up long-range spatial correlations
and a threshold in the variable used to rank its agents.
We have shown that our model economy evolves to a
critical state when driven by extremal dynamics. This
occurs without fine-tuning of parameters, i.e., the sys-
tem is self-organized. We measured the distribution of
spatial separations of consecutive activity in the system,
and found two power laws (left and right) with exponents
pi(right) = 1.844± 0.002 and pi(left) = 2.021± 0.002, with
a 70% backing of the fit. The system’s dynamics does
not have an attractive fixed point, but only an attractive
asymptote. Hence we rescaled it to a (statistically) sta-
tionary state where the definition of avalanches is possi-
ble. After this rescaling, we found a power law for the dis-
tribution of avalanche sizes with exponent τ = 1.48±0.03.
The system studied here is brutally minimalistic.
There is room for several amendments towards improved
realism, with little loss in simplicity. For example, on a
two-dimensional square lattice each agent can have two
suppliers and two costumers, allowing for competition,
hence a market-like scenario. In this sense, networks with
higher coordination numbers are even more realistic. We
expect criticality also in these cases, but with different
exponents.
Acknowledgments. SFN thanks H. Flyvbjerg and
I. M. Tolic´ for helpful discussions. SFN acknowledges
financial support from the Lørup Foundation.
[1] P. Bak, C. Tang, and K. Wiesenfeld, Phys. Rev. Lett.
59, 381 (1987).
[2] S. Field, J. Witt, and F. Nori, Phys. Rev. Lett. 74, 1206
(1995).
[3] P. Bak, How Nature Works (Oxford University Press,
1997)
[4] P. Bak and K. Sneppen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 71, 4083 (1993).
H. Flyvbjerg, K. Sneppen, and P. Bak, ibid. 71, 4087
(1993).
[5] P. Bak, K. Chen, and C. Tang, Phys. Lett. A 147, 297
(1990).
[6] D. Wilkinson and J. F. Willemsen, J. Phys. A 16, 3365,
(1983).
[7] D. L. Turcotte, Rep. Progr. Phys. 62, 1377 (1999).
[8] R. Richter, Money, chapter 1 (Springer, 1989).
[9] A. Trejos and R. Wright, J. Political Economy 103, 118
(1995).
[10] P. Bak, S. F. Nørrelykke, and M. Shubik, Phys. Rev. E.
60, 2528 (1999).
[11] This result does not depend on the specific choice in
Eq. (3). Studying a more general version of the utility
function un = −aq
α
n + bq
β
n+1, we find with the specified
set of rules that inflation will occur as long as α > β > 0.
[12] The interval [1,2] is an arbitrary choice, the only demand
on the initial prices is that they are positive.
[13] An avalanche starter is an agent with profit above the
threshold, who is chosen as loser by our algorithm. This
happens only when there are no agents with profits below
the threshold, i.e., when an avalanche is over, per defi-
nition. Potentially, a new avalanche is triggered by this
agent. But it is not connected to the previous avalanche:
Agents with profits above threshold are approximately
uniformly distributed in space, hence so is the starting
point of the new avalanche.
[14] The error we give for the fitted value of a parameter is
just the square root of the variance found for that fit-
ting parameter. This is the error to be expected when
all other parameters are kept fixed. When they are not,
larger errors are to be expected, as expressed by the
variance-covariance matrix of the fit. If we set the value
of pi(left) to 2, i.e., fix it more than 9 standard devia-
tions below the fitted level, the backing drops, but only
to P1936(> 2023) = 8.4%, i.e, not enough to falsify the
hypothesis that pi(left) = 2.
[15] This relation is only a first approximation since the loser
often has to change his price more than once in order
to increase his profit enough. A better approximation in-
cluding this effect is used in the actual rescaling.
[16] D. Stauffer and A. Aharony, Introduction to Percolation
Theory (Taylor & Francis, revised second edition, 1994).
[17] M. Paczuski, S. Maslov, and P. Bak, Phys. Rev. E 53,
414 (1996).
[18] R. Bundschuh and M. La¨ssig, Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 4273
(1996).
[19] H. Flyvbjerg, Phys. Rev. Lett. 76, 940 (1996); H. Flyvb-
jerg, ibid. 77, 4274 (1996).
4
